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Agricultural development policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa continue to be weak, 
and the reasons are to be found in the 
incentives transmitted to policy makers 
by countries’ domestic political systems. 
The enfranchisement of rural voters 
within multi-party political systems does 
not seem to have altered the fundamental 
dynamics, raising the question whether – in 
Africa as in Asia – successful agricultural 
transformation will happen first in countries 
whose rulers are driven by concerns to avert 
rural-based political threats of a more 
fundamental sort. This paper explores 
this question with reference to Rwanda. 
It argues that the political incentives are 
indeed different from those in comparable 
African countries, but that this did not 
immediately lead to the adoption of an 
appropriate agricultural strategy. Today, 
thanks to a major shock and some serious 
rethinking, policy has turned a corner 
and the results are promising. What this 
experience has revealed is that the political 
economy of agricultural policy in Rwanda 
is distinguished by a capacity for learning 
from errors as well as a seriousness about 
implementation that are not widely 
observed elsewhere in the region.
1. Introduction
Within the panorama of recent economic and social 
progress in sub-Saharan Africa, neglect of agriculture 
remains one of the most fundamental weaknesses. A 
quarter-century after economic liberalisation began 
removing the most important market distortions 
holding back Africa’s rural economies, agricultural 
issues still receive an inadequate level and quality of 
policy attention. Despite the welcome shift in regional 
opinion signalled by the Maputo Declaration and CAADP 
initiative of 2003, investment in the infrastructural and 
institutional public goods and smart subsidies needed to 
kick-start productivity growth in smallholder farming falls 
well short of requirements (Poulton, 2011). It certainly 
compares unfavourably with the level attained in 
comparable regions of the world, such as Southeast 
Asia, at an equivalent stage in their development (van 
Donge et al., 2012). The central hypothesis of the Political 
Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa (PEAPA) project 
is that the reasons for this state of affairs are to be found 
in the incentives transmitted to policy makers by the 
domestic political systems of African countries (Poulton, 
2011: 3).
As Colin Poulton (2011) shows, economic liberalisation 
since the end of the 1980s has made a significantly 
positive contribution to the conditions for agricultural 
growth, but political liberalisation has been of more 
ambiguous benefit. The PEAPA country studies tend to 
suggest that the new power acquired by rural voters 
under multi-party political systems does not translate into 
incentives for politicians to favour agriculture as a sector. 
Democratisation has given a new form to the clientelist 
agricultural policies analysed in earlier eras by Bates (1981) 
and van de Walle (2001); it has not fundamentally altered 
their content. Bold gestures of support to politically salient 
sub-sectors are a feature of the politics of agriculture 
now as they were then, but the quality of policy delivery 
remains weak, whilst comprehensive, non-discretionary, 
support to smallholders as a group continues to be rare. 
Competitive clientelism within a democratic framework 
appears to induce political incentives that are inimical 
to the large and sustained investments in public goods 
that are needed for agricultural transformation.1
In some respects, this is an unsurprising finding. As 
Poulton (2011: 5) points out, processes of agricultural 
change equivalent to those now on the agenda in Africa 
have rarely been driven by electoral demand. The policies 
which induced smallholder-based transformations in 
several parts of Asia after the Second World War were 
most often the response of political elites to threats to 
their survival coming from rural constituencies with 
Communist sympathies in their own or neighbouring 
countries. The ‘green revolutions’ that were achieved 
during and since the 1960s in several parts of Southeast 
Asia – including countries initially quite similar to those of 
sub-Saharan Africa – took place under political regimes 
of quite varied types. However, none of these were 
conspicuous for their compliance with today’s norms of 
efficient administration and democratic ‘good governance’ 
(van Donge et al., 2012). In this context, a crucial issue 
for the PEAPA project is whether there are countries in 
Africa where improved agricultural performance is to be 
expected because the political incentives of the ruling 
elite have more of an ‘Asian’ quality.
Poulton (2011: 23-26) identifies two current regimes 
as having at least some of the required features, 
those presided over by the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) in Rwanda and the EPRDF in Ethiopia. Neither 
regime qualifies as politically liberal or conventionally 
democratic, but in both cases the elite in power appears 
motivated in ways that are untypical in the African 
context. Relevant explanatory factors include an implied 
threat to regime survival from a rural majority as well as 
opponents abroad against the background of a violent 
past history in which both rural discontent and ethnic 
exclusion played a significant part. This paper deals with 
the case of Rwanda.2
The paper contributes to the PEAPA project alongside 
studies of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique and Tanzania. It also draws on research 
for the Africa Power and Politics Programme (www.
institutions-africa.org) which has compared the historical 
and contemporary political economies of Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
After discussing in Section 2 the extent to which 
the overall political economy of policy in Rwanda is 
distinctive, the paper sets out a hypothesis concerning 
the way political imperatives and incentives might 
be expected to influence policy processes affecting 
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agriculture and horticulture under such a regime. Section 
3 introduces the particular challenges posed by a) broad-
based agricultural transformation and b) the creation 
of a commercial horticulture sector in Rwanda. Against 
this background, Section 4 then considers whether 
sectoral and sub-sectoral (horticultural) performance 
and the evolution of the relevant policies supports this 
interpretation. Section 5 sums up and considers the 
implications of the paper’s findings for the future of 
agricultural transformation in Rwanda.
2 A distinctive political 
economy
Our approach in this section is deliberately comparative. 
Drawing on the APPP research, we aim to locate the overall 
political economy of contemporary Rwanda in relation 
to what we take as the ‘modal pattern’ in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The APPP work (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011; Kelsall, 
2011; forthcoming) makes a case for distinguishing 
among more developmental and less developmental 
types of clientelist or ‘neopatrimonial’ political regime. 
This distinction appears to be necessary in order to make 
sense of the major long-run performance differences 
among and between African and Asian states. It cuts 
across the conventional dichotomy between democratic 
and non-democratic regime types and appears more 
consistent with the observed variations in development 
outcomes than the conventional assumption that 
performance varies with the extent to which regimes 
follow international norms of ‘good governance’.
In the APPP analysis, ‘developmental patrimonial’ 
regimes are those where control of major sources of 
economic rent – including corruption – have been i) 
effectively centralised and ii) deployed in ways that 
correspond to a long-horizon vision, including ways 
that are objectively developmental. Several historic 
regimes in Africa, as well as all of the early developmental 
successes in East and Southeast Asia, appear to share 
these features.
2.1 Developmental 
patrimonialism?
As we have argued elsewhere (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi, 2011), the Rwandan regime differs from 
other exemplars of developmental patrimonialism 
in that corruption is rigorously suppressed, rather 
than centralised. And the personal dominance 
exercised by Kagame (allegations from international 
opposition quarters notwithstanding) is not the sort 
of ‘big-man syndrome’ usually taken as definitional of 
neopatrimonialism. Nonetheless, central management 
of other kinds of rent in a long-horizon framework is a 
strong feature, and indeed helps to explain the low level 
of corruption. 
The fundamental drivers of this orientation do bear 
comparison with Asia. In the African modal pattern, 
the political leadership maintains itself in power by 
distributing rent-taking opportunities to its major 
supporters. At least since 2000, this has not been the 
pattern in Rwanda. In the terms used by Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita and his co-authors (2003) the political 
system of the country has a moderately large ‘selectorate’ 
(enfranchised citizens) and a smaller winning coalition 
(the subset of selectors whose support is decisive to 
the retention of power by the incumbents). Under 
these conditions, the theory – which applies equally to 
regimes which are formally democratic or authoritarian 
– predicts a leadership preference for providing private 
goods selectively to members of the coalition, as the 
cheapest and most reliable means of political survival. 
Contrary to the theory, the RPF and its allies are gambling 
on the ‘expensive’ option of building support on a broad 
base by demonstrating an ability to provide more and 
better public goods.
In Rwanda since 2000, policy has been driven rather 
exclusively by the view that economic and social 
development – underpinned by adequate provision of 
essential public goods by the state – is the only feasible 
route to overcoming the ethnic divisions and violent 
conflicts of the past. Thus, as in the case of most if not all 
of the East and Southeast Asian developmental regimes, 
the Rwandan leadership has become convinced that 
an economic and social transformation is a necessary 
condition for avoiding in the future a repetition of a 
recently remembered national disaster.
This is formally articulated in a document called 
Rwanda Vision 2020. Contrary to what happens with 
equivalent documents in most countries of the region, 
this is a real point of reference for ministers and civil 
servants.3
The assumption underlying the vision is that, if 
economic and social progress occurs fast enough, a 
new generation will emerge who are capable of fully 
assuming their national identity as Rwandans rather 
than privileging what divided them in the past. Many 
critics of the regime see this as naive and argue that 
reconciliation needs to be attended to in a more direct 
fashion (e.g., Reyntjens, 2004; Straus and Waldorf, 2011). 
But in so doing they also confirm that this is indeed the 
vision that drives policy.
In the African modal pattern, policy-making is driven 
away from a public-goods focus by the need to create 
rents to allocate to supporters and more generally 
to finance politics. One of the things that enable the 
Rwandan regime to deviate from this pattern is the role 
played by a private holding company fully owned by 
the ruling party, the RPF. Formerly known as Tri-Star 
Investments, and now trading as Crystal Ventures Ltd., 
this company played a significant role in kick-starting 
the Rwandan economy after 1994 and is now moving 
into something approaching a venture-capital role. We 
argue that the rental flows associated with Tri-Star/CVL 
help to meet the funding needs of the political class while 
also fulfilling the requirements of what is today called 
an active industrial policy (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 
2011).
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The mechanism provided by Tri-Star/CVL helps to 
explain how the long-horizon, public goods orientation 
of policy in Rwanda can be sustained against pressures 
from within the ruling elite to be more conventionally 
clientelistic. However, the orientation itself would be 
hard to understand without the implicit threat to regime 
survival provided by the events and legacies of the 1994 
genocide.
The national disaster in the background explains 
two other feature of the Rwandan political system 
under Kagame which is potentially relevant to the way 
agricultural policies relate to politics. One is the restricted 
nature of political competition. Because unrestrained 
political competition under post-genocide circumstances 
would almost certainly derail the current development 
efforts by permitting a renewed politicisation of ethnicity, 
the regime has opted for limiting and regulating party 
politics. It has kept tight control of a large military and 
security apparatus, the ultimate guarantor of power. It 
also bans parties that fail to comply with a strict, and some 
would say partial, rules on non-ethnic campaigning. In 
this sense, too, Kagame and the RPF do not need to be 
creating and distributing rent opportunities to individual 
business people or middle-rank politicians in order to 
remain in power.
The other feature of the current political settlement 
worth mentioning is the extent to which the RPF shares 
power with those other parties that are legal and obtain 
a significant share of the vote in parliamentary elections. 
Critics tend to dismiss this as window-dressing, but it 
needs to be viewed in the context of the harm done, to 
the maintenance of peace and to the quality of policy-
making by winner-takes-all constitutional arrangements 
in other countries of the region.
Under the 2003 Constitution, ministerial posts, 
which cannot be held by MPs on a separation-of-
powers principle, are shared among the legal parties in 
proportion to their seats in the Chamber of Deputies, with 
the majority party (the RPF) holding no more than 50% of 
the portfolios (Rwanda, 2003: Art. 116). By convention, the 
Prime Minister, the Speaker of parliament, the President 
of the Senate, and the President of the Supreme Court 
are also expected to be of a different party or tendency 
from that of the president.4 This has the effect of softening 
the sense of exclusion among losing parties, and of 
enabling cabinets to work cooperatively with a view to 
shared long-term interests. There is also no conventional 
opposition in parliament that needs to be bought off, 
allowing the proceedings of parliament to be guided by 
a consensus rather than an adversarial approach. The 
effect is that, other things being equal, criticism of policies 
tends to be channelled into policy adjustments rather 
than political horse-trading.
Two further features of the overall political economy 
seem potentially relevant to the quality of policy for 
agriculture. First, implementation incentives, and the 
detection and correction of implementation failures 
and abuses, are prominent features of the policy system. 
This is not just because there is ‘political will’ at the top. 
There are also institutional arrangements that enforce 
these features. The Annual National Dialogue is one of 
a series of mechanisms which combine public shaming 
with rather proactive follow-up by the president. 
Ministers, civil servants and local-government officials 
are regularly called to account and not infrequently 
dismissed for their performance in relation to policy 
targets. The imihigo system, a performance contract 
with neo-traditional overtones, produces quite powerful 
incentives from the cabinet downwards to deliver on 
agreed commitments.
The other potentially crucial factor in the delivery of 
the agreed policies for agriculture and horticulture is local 
government. As in other countries, in Rwanda the division 
of labour between line ministries, public agencies and local 
authorities is now quite complex. Ministries set policies 
and monitor, and agencies implement at the national 
level, but districts and lower tiers of local government 
provide many of the front-line services, including those 
relevant to productive sectors. It therefore matters how 
politics interfaces with implementation at local level.
Local authorities in Rwanda have limited autonomy; 
they are subject to a fairly high degree of control and 
direction by the centre. Mayors and councillors are 
elected on an individual merit, not party, basis. Mayors 
as well as local civil servants sign up to imihigo contracts 
and targets. In these ways the centre does get local 
governments to do what it considers most important 
in terms of designing and implementing priority 
programmes and activities. None of this guarantees 
that they are an efficient instrument for delivering 
programmes. Rwandan government systems continue 
to have significant weaknesses, some of which are not 
unrelated to the unremitting pressure for performance. 
But the centrally driven performance culture ensures, 
at least, that there are quite strong incentives working 
against manifestly poor delivery.
2.2 A hypothesis
The PEAPA project is interested in the overall hypothesis 
that policy will be more favourable to broad-based 
agricultural transformation under regimes that perceive 
their survival to be bound up with their ability to address 
the causes of past conflict and mitigate the enduring 
threats posed by discontented rural majorities. Prima 
facie, the regime in Rwanda since Kagame’s accession 
to the presidency in 2000 does qualify as a regime of this 
type. The details provided in this section have supported 
the general suggestion that the political economy of 
policy making and implementation in Rwanda has a 
number of distinctive features compared with the modal 
pattern in the sub-Saharan African region.
To summarise, the particular form of ‘developmental 
patrimonialism’ that has been adopted frees the 
government from the imperative to make policies that 
meet the interests of powerful clients or respond in a 
short-term way to the concerns of voters. Neither political 
and administrative corruption nor electoral pressures 
are prominent features of the policy process, in sharp 
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distinction with the pattern in most of the countries in 
the PEAPA set. The restrictions on political competition 
and the use of the power-sharing principle mean that 
agricultural policy is not bound up with a system of 
political patronage and clientelism in the way it typically is 
elsewhere. Not only cabinets and parliaments but also local 
governments have incentives to work in a collaborative 
way towards the improvement and implementation of 
policies. Policy is highly politicised, but not in the sense 
of being driven by short-term power calculations. As a 
consequence, strategic policy documents are serious 
points of reference for government, and not just a matter 
of token compliance with donor ideas about strategic 
planning.
Does the evidence also support the second part of 
the PEAPA hypothesis, namely that this type of regime 
may be expected to deliver high-quality agricultural 
policies? This is the subject of the remainder of the paper. 
The argument is that until recently the evidence on this 
subject has been inconclusive if not negative, but that 
policy has turned a corner since the mid-2000s. Results 
have improved, and this seems to reflect better policy 
thinking and practice. In the final analysis, the trends 
suggest that Rwanda may be on its way to becoming 
an agricultural success story. In default of that, the 
capacity for learning and readjustment that the regime 
has displayed in the fields of agricultural and horticultural 
policy over the last five to seven years differentiates it 
clearly from the patterns observed other countries in 
the PEAPA set.
3 The challenge of 
agricultural 
transformation
Agricultural transformation in Rwanda poses 
challenges that might be considered more typical of 
Asia than of Africa. The second most densely populated 
country in sub-Saharan Africa after Mauritius (384 persons 
per km2 in 2008), its population of around 10 million was, 
at the last count, still growing at a vigorous 2.8% per year 
(World Bank, 2011). The agricultural sector, including food 
crop and export crop production, livestock, forestry and 
fisheries, contributes 32% to GDP (NISR, 2011), but much 
more to employment. Agriculture or livestock provides the 
main occupation to up to 85% of the economically active 
population. Household production on micro-holdings 
has been overwhelmingly predominant, with average 
holdings of around 0.76 ha in about four separate plots. 
Productivity is well below potential, and income levels in 
agriculture remain extremely low (RADA, 2007).
As well as being the key to sustaining and improving 
livelihoods for the bulk of the population, the sector 
has strong potential as a source of economic growth 
and exports. Coffee and tea, and to a lesser extent 
pyrethrum, have been significant export crops for a long 
time. Minerals and tourism are increasingly important 
sources of export earnings (although foreign aid funds 
are likely to remain a critical source of hard currency for 
some time yet). However, the country’s most important 
non-human natural resource is its land and climate, and 
the biggest national economic challenge is to harness 
this more effectively.
The country’s highland equatorial climate is suited to 
a wide range of cultivars. Average rainfall is high (800 
to over 1600 mm annually, with two extended rainy 
seasons, March-May and Sept-Dec). The undulating 
topography which characterises most of the country 
produces micro-climates suited to a variety of mixed 
farming or horticultural activities. Soil erosion and 
soil exhaustion are serious problems on the hillsides 
where most production of staples takes place. These 
are technically soluble problems but call for substantial 
investments in conservation measures and improved 
inputs. The marshy valleys offer considerable unexploited 
potential for irrigation and drainage (Kalibata, 2010b). 
Livestock production accounts for around 5% of the 
sector gross product and 2% of GDP (NISR, 2011). Until 
recently, however, there has been rather limited use 
of livestock or livestock products such as manure in 
cultivation. Chemical fertiliser use has been far below 
the developing country average, 4kg/ha compared with 
300-400 kg/ha (World Bank, 2010: 127).
Yields for several traditional staples and tea have been 
well below potential as measured by world averages and 
in some cases by comparison with African neighbours 
(Table 1). 
Until the early 1990s food-crop production largely 
covered domestic consumption, although yields for most 
crops were in decline (GoR, 2002: Annex Table 2.5). Food 
supply was then seriously compromised until recently 
by the combination of genocide-related population 
changes, demographic pressure (intensive low-input 
farming, settlement of returnees in forest zones, 
fragmentation of holdings) and frequent droughts 
(RADA, 2007).
The most important challenge for the country, 
therefore, is to bring agricultural productivity closer to 
its potential. While there is much room for improvement 
in production of staple root crops, bananas and grains, 
commercial horticulture is also promising as a 
contribution to this effort. Since the genocide, land has 
become legally private property, and under recent 
legislation is held by families rather than individuals, a 
particularly important development in a country where 
some 38% of households are headed by a single woman. 
Although population pressure on the land is severe 
generally, there is under-utilised marsh land. Unlike the 
hillsides, marsh land belongs to the state, making it 
particularly amenable to consolidated production and 
other transformative initiatives.
Rwanda’s climate and topography are very suited to 
production of a range of fruits, vegetables and flowers. 
A broad band of cool and humid terrain in the west is 
suited to European-style fruits and vegetables, including 
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beans, peas, cauliflower, mushrooms, citrus and 
strawberries. The warm and humid central-south is ideal 
for tropical fruits such as banana, passion fruit and 
pineapple. The warm and dry north-east is suited to 
groundnut, sunflower and pulses (RDB/RHODA, 2010). 
In summary, Rwanda enjoys the same agro-climatic 
advantages for horticulture as other East African countries 
with some additional natural niche advantages due to 
the diversity of its topography.
Unlike the case of major staples, yields for fruit 
horticulture in 2009 were already within the regional 
band – between Kenya and Ethiopia at the top end and 
Uganda and Tanzania at the bottom (RDB/RHODA, 2010). 
This was before much investment had yet taken place 
in improved planting materials or methods. The 
government considers this as indicative of an 
extraordinary potential for growth.
In developing commercial horticulture, Rwanda is 
starting from a very low base, compared with Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, horticulture 
is now the fastest-growing export sector (MINICOM, 
2011). Rwandan horticulture seems well placed to benefit 
from the current revival in global demand for horticultural 
products (from China, India and the Gulf more than from 
Europe) as well as in sub-regional markets (Congo) and 
domestically.
An important part of the policy challenge in Rwanda 
is that of getting the right balance between productivity 
growth and income distribution. Building on a long 
tradition of fieldwork-based scepticism about official 
efforts to modernise agriculture in Rwanda,5 An Ansoms 
has provided a telling technical analysis of the negative 
distributional consequences likely to ensue if 
intensification and commercialisation of Rwandan 
farming are pursued without deliberate attention to the 
institutional barriers to adoption by the poorer strata in 
the peasantry (2008; 2011b). The implementation of the 
2005 legislation on land registration poses a further set 
of opportunities and uncertainties (Pottier, 2006; Daley 
et al., 2010; Ayalew Ali et al., 2011).
Finally, on the basis of a computable general 
equilibrium model for the Rwandan economy, Diao et 
al. (Lambert and MacNeil, 2009; Diao et al., 2010) have 
shown that Rwanda needs to exceed the 6% CAADP 
target for agricultural growth if it is to meet its MDG target 
of halving its 2001 poverty incidence by 2015. On its 
own, sectoral growth is likely to be accompanied by rising 
inequality reflecting differences in market and land 
access. In order to minimise these effects, a strong policy 
emphasis needs to be placed on increased production 
of staple crops and livestock, rather than on traditional 
or new export crops.
4 The policy regime: results 
and learning
Given this background, post-genocide Rwanda might 
have been expected to embrace from the outset an ‘Asian’ 
approach to agricultural transformation; that is, place a 
heavy emphasis on the delivery of the public goods 
required to revolutionise smallholder productivity, 
especially in food staples. It has not done so, or at least 
not yet. In terms of the systematic differences documented 
by the Leiden-based Tracking Development project 
between the rural development policies of Southeast 
Asian and equivalent African countries (van Donge et 
al., 2012), Rwanda has remained on the African side of 
the divide. That is, transforming smallholder agriculture 
has not been given effective priority, for reasons including 
Table 1: Comparative crop yields (t/ha 1999-2003 average)
Rwanda Burundi Ethiopia Tanzania Uganda Africa 
average
World 
average
Maize 0.8 1.1 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.3 4.4
Sorghum 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.8 1.3
Cassava 6.1 9.0 n.a. 10.2 13.2 8.9 10.6
S/potatoes 5.8 6.5 9.6 1.9 4.4 4.6 14.9
Potatoes 8.0 2.6 9.1 6.9 7.0 7.7 16.3
Plantains 6.5 5.2 16.0 2.2 5.9 5.6 6.3
Beans 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7
Peas 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.7
Coffee 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.7
Tea 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.3
Source: FAO, as reported in Kalibata (2010b).
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those that apply elsewhere: competing social investments; 
political ideologies and professional prejudices which 
under-rate the importance of agriculture, and 
inconsistency on the part of major aid donors (Henley 
et al., 2012). On the other hand, the evidence to be 
presented in this section suggests that in some important 
respects sectoral policy has turned a corner in recent 
years.
4.1 Results
Post-genocide Rwanda has not always been a good 
agricultural performer. In the mid-2000s, especially the 
drought year of 2003, several parts of the country 
experienced crises of food shortage which delivered a 
substantial shock to the national economy as well as 
causing localised hunger (Evans et al., 2006: 50). Largely 
as a consequence, real GDP growth, having maintained 
rates of over 8% in the first years of the millennium, 
dropped to 2% in 2003, resuming rates of 7% and above 
only in 2004 (Table 2).
Following two difficult years, 2003 and 2004, in which 
food crop output declined by 4% and registered 0% 
growth, there was a bounce-back in food production in 
2005. Healthy growth was restored in 2008 and 2009. 
Improved rainfall was no doubt a major factor, but the 
more recent improvements also seem likely to be a 
reflection of the adoption and implementation of a new 
agricultural strategy. Agriculture was a negative factor 
in overall economic growth for some years. However, 
since 2008 the relationship has been reversed, with 
agriculture helping to push the overall GDP rate into 
double digits in 2008 and steady agricultural performance 
supporting more modest total growth since then (IMF, 
2009: Figure 1; AfDB et al., 2011).
Agricultural output growth has been based on a 
combination of yield increases and bringing new land 
into cultivation. But according to (World Bank, 2007: Ch. 
5), it has been clear for some time that future growth will 
need to be largely of the former kind, meaning greater 
investments and organisational effort to generate further 
increases in output. 6 For different crop types, the priorities 
for investment include raising input use from a very low 
current level (maize, wheat, rice), soil conservation and 
storage improvements (banana, cassava and sweet 
potato), and value addition (for all of the above plus soya 
and Irish potatoes).
According to government sources, there have been 
some spectacular successes of this type: maize output 
was raised from 167,000 MT to 287,000 MT in 2009, and 
major gains were also registered for wheat and Irish 
potatoes. Rice, another crop that has been actively 
promoted since the years of food crisis, was by 2007-9 
showing yields significantly above those of all other East 
African countries, including Kenya (RDB/RHODA, 2010: 
15). Even though an estimated 28% of the population 
Figure 1: Poverty headcount changes for Rwanda
Source: Integrated Household Living Conditions Surveys as reported in NISR (2012).
Table 2: Annual real growth of GDP and agricultural product, 2000-2010 (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP 8.4 8.5 13.2 2.2 7.4 9.4 9.2 7.7 11.5 6.1 7.5
Agriculture 8 9 17 -3 2 6 3 3 6 8 5
Source: NISR (2011: Table 2A).
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remain food-insecure (AfDB et al., 2010), the hunger map 
of the country has apparently changed substantially. 
Based on annual crop assessments, the 13 districts falling 
in the worst two categories for food availability in 2006 
were reduced to two by 2008 (Kalibata, n.d.). 
Not only is hunger coming under control, but poverty 
rates are falling, and so is inequality. This is in contrast 
with trends in the first half of the 2000s, when poverty 
rates remained stubbornly high despite healthy GDP 
growth and inequality increased (Figures 1 and 2). This 
is a turnaround that calls for explanation. Improved 
policy, reflecting significant policy learning seems to 
provide at least a part of the explanation.
4.2 What has been the policy 
for agriculture?
As in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the official 
vision and development strategy documents accord a 
central place to agricultural transformation. The Vision 
2020 document produced in 2000 (GoR, 2000) was a little 
ambiguous, emphasising the importance of agricultural 
intensification and commercialisation, but also holding 
out the prospect of a decline in agriculture’s share in 
GDP as a result of structural change as early as the 
decade 2010-20. On the other hand, the first Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GoR, 2002) placed rural development 
and agricultural transformation at the top of a list of six 
‘broad priority areas’. The second PRS, the Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008-2012 
(GoR, 2007) had ‘releasing the productive capacity of the 
poor in rural areas’ as one of three Flagship Programmes 
along with investments in ‘hard infrastructure’ and ‘soft 
infrastructure’.
As elsewhere, of course, formal ‘priority’ does not 
automatically translate into corresponding public 
spending allocations. However, for reasons explained 
above Vision 2020 and its implementation frameworks are 
more genuine reference points for government officials 
than the equivalent documents in other countries. 
Moreover, Rwandan policy for agriculture is evolving 
fast. Successes in transformation are as yet tentative and 
fragile. Nevertheless, an appropriate policy approach has 
taken shape, funding to the sector is going up and there 
are grounds for optimism about implementation.
To begin with, a good deal has been done since the 
first PRS to flesh out the idea of prioritising agriculture. 
Following the food crises of the mid-2000s, a new 
agricultural strategy was developed (MINAGRI, 2004). 
At its core is a Crop Intensification Programme overseen 
by a government agency, the Rwanda Agriculture 
Development Authority (RADA). This has donor support 
through an Agriculture Sector Investment Programme 
coordinated by the World Bank and associated projects. 
Agricultural policy now has a definite sense of direction, 
thanks in part to the food shocks, but also to a learning 
process in which donors as well as the government have 
corrected their earlier assessments.
In Rwanda, there is a tendency for both donors and 
government to claim the credit for poverty-oriented 
shifts in policy (Hayman, 2009; Putzel and Golooba-
Mutebi, 2009). In this instance, it seems clear that both 
government and donors were unpleasantly surprised 
by the failure of the first PRS to reduce income-poverty 
substantially, and revised their positions on agriculture 
accordingly. Some donors and the independent 
evaluation of the first PRSP were critical of the lack of a 
broad-based approach to agricultural transformation 
(Evans et al., 2006: 26-27; Putzel and Golooba-Mutebi, 
2009: 12, 22). On the other hand, the minister in charge 
of the agriculture portfolio during 1999-2004 recalls that 
getting the generality of donors interested in anything 
other than ‘social’ issues was hard throughout the period. 
There was a World Bank loan for rehabilitation of 
Figure 2: Inequality in Rwanda, 2000/1-2010/11
Source: Integrated Household Living Conditions Surveys as reported in NISR (2012).
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marshlands, but both the Bank and USAID were slow to 
support a fertiliser programme despite the strong case 
made out by veteran green-revolutionist John Mellor 
(2001). Two sets of donor-funded consultants warned 
the government off investing in horticulture.7
Since then, attitudes have changed on both sides. Not 
only is there a worked out policy, but it appears to be 
genuinely shared between the government and sector 
donors (not something that can always be said). Crucially, 
implementation appears relatively serious, with plenty 
of signs that words are being translated into actions and 
results (Kalibata, 2010a; MINAGRI, 2011).
The main elements of the current approach are:
A focus on general distribution of improved seed •	
and fertiliser at subsidised prices through local 
governments. Under this policy, national average 
fertiliser use was raised from 6 kg/ha per annum 
in 2006 to 30 kg/ha in 2010 (MINECOFIN, 2011: 
15). In order to combat the re-sale of subsidised 
inputs by beneficiaries, there has been some 
experimentation with the use of vouchers. 
Importantly, this input distribution system does 
not appear to involve the gross political clientelism 
that is associated with input subsidies elsewhere 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Land consolidation; that is, the promotion of •	
synchronised planting and harvesting by 
smallholders in (service) cooperatives. This 
initiative, which was pioneered with maize and 
rice, is designed to gain benefits of scale in 
conservation measures, input utilisation and 
harvesting without undermining the principles 
of family land ownership and individual 
cultivation.8 It is accompanied by a policy of 
relocating rural dwellings whose purposes 
include freeing up cultivable land and permitting 
more efficient shared services (imidugudu).
Medium-scale irrigation of under-utilised •	
marshlands, especially for rice.
Promotion of sound intensification principles by •	
district extension staffs, including enforcement 
of the legal ban on further fragmentation of 
holdings, and advocacy of mulching, small-scale 
irrigation and renewal of terraces. The scale of 
this activity is limited by the fact that Agricultural 
Officers are few in number – one per district, 
serving perhaps 200,000 people. They, however, 
are supported by a more junior extension officer 
in each of a district’s ‘sectors’, with a reported 436 
Agro-dealers operating at sector level by 2010 
(MINECOFIN, 2011: 16). According to the 
retrospective report on the EDPRS, the proportion 
of agricultural land protected from soil erosion 
was 87% by 2010/11, up from 40% in 2006 
(MINECOFIN, 2012: 13).
National promotion of ‘one cow per family’, a •	
policy similar to the heifer schemes supported 
by donor projects in other countries, where 
animals are distributed free on the understanding 
that their first-born calves are returned to the 
scheme. The programme has multiple objectives, 
including improving family nutrition, providing 
a source of cash income and generating manure 
for soil improvement. Early abuses in which local 
leaders or better-off farmers diverted the animals 
to their own benefit were brought to the attention 
of the Annual National Dialogue in 2009, after 
which active presidential oversight became a 
factor in better-targeted implementation.
The policy just described has been given a somewhat 
rough ride in the academic literature on Rwanda. As 
noted earlier, Ansoms’ careful study of stratification 
within the peasant sector in Rwanda gives rise to 
legitimate concerns based on international experience 
about the likely distributional impacts of commercial 
monocropping. Together with the IFPRI modelling work, 
this raises the question of whether enough is being done 
to ensure that the poorer, food insecure groups are being 
included. However, these queries need to be addressed 
to an accurate representation of what the policy now is. 
In other work, Ansoms has used discourse analysis to 
make inferences about the ‘ambitions of the Rwandan 
elite’ (2009: 299-301, 309; 2011a: 244-245). There she 
presents land consolidation as equivalent to collective 
ownership, and commercialisation as tantamount to 
marginalising smallholders. This does not seem a fair 
representation of the policy. In particular, it downplays, 
or fails to anticipate, the way current policy rests on 
promoting service cooperatives to take advantage of 
economies of scale in input provision and marketing 
while retaining family land rights and production 
incentives.
Similarly, the most widely read treatments of the 
imihigo performance-contract approach in local 
government (Ingelaere, 2010; 2011) and of Rwanda-
variant ‘villagisation’ (imidugudu) (Newbury, 2011) also 
place the accent on showing how these policy elements 
reflect what is taken to be the RPF’s ideology. The 
possibility that, ideology apart, they may help to ensure 
that government services reach the peasantry at large 
– the key to an outcome which is pro-poor, as exemplified 
by rural intensification in East and Southeast Asia – 
therefore gets short shrift.
A serious issue, less emphasised by the ‘discourse’ 
approach, is whether the agricultural strategy is getting 
the resources it needs. If the policy means what it says, 
the scale of the task is huge. The question arises whether 
the material and particularly the skilled human resources 
being devoted to implementation are sufficient.
Until now, public spending on agriculture has been 
both low and erratic in relation to the scale of investment 
needed to restore and increase land productivity. The 
share of the national budget allocated to the Ministry of 
Agriculture reached nearly 7% in 2001 but declined 
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thereafter. A sectoral Public Expenditure Review carried 
out in 2007 gave quite a damning account of the failure 
of public spending patterns to comply with the priority 
accorded in theory to agriculture. MINAGRI’s share of the 
national budget was as low as 3.5% in 2007, and the 
proportion was only slightly higher after including other 
ministries’ spending in the sector. At that time, earmarked 
agriculture spending by districts raised the sector share 
by only a further four percentage points. Budget 
execution rates for agriculture over the period to 2007 
fluctuated above and below the allocations, mainly on 
account of large projects. Agriculture did particularly 
badly in terms of the trends in real budget allocations 
compared with health and education, which recorded 
growth over the three years 2004-7 of 95% and 44% 
respectively (World Bank, 2010: 112-117).
It is not the case, therefore, that Rwanda has been a 
good performer in terms of consistent focus on 
agricultural development. The Ministry has been pressing 
the government to reach the target set under the CAADP 
by raising spending to 10% of the national budget.9 
However, there is a great deal of catching up to be done 
(OTF Group, 2009). As a proportion of agricultural GDP, 
the 2007 Ministry spend was even worse in comparative 
terms than the headline proportion of the budget.
Although Rwanda’s rate of 3% was comparable with 
Uganda’s, a study by Fan and Rao (2003) found an average 
for 17 sub-Saharan African countries of 6.7%. For all 44 
developing countries included in the study, it was 10.3%. 
Research is also under-funded in comparative terms and 
extension services in 2007 were ‘limited’. The position of 
agriculture is improved if off-budget donor spending is 
taken into account (off-budget development funds were 
78% of total on-budget development expenditure in 
2007) (World Bank, 2010: xxii, 117-125).
Recently, public expenditure has been rising, the 
MINAGRI share returning to nearly 7% in 2010/11. This 
level of spending is expected to be maintained in 2011/12, 
and according to the government, the CAADP target will 
now be met. This is understood to refer to a total for 
agriculture-related spending, including relevant activities 
of the Rwanda Development Board, the Rwanda 
Development Bank and some other public bodies (FAO, 
2010; Majyambere, 2011; MINAGRI, n.d.).
It needs to be borne in mind that the CAADP target 
applies equally to large countries with major infrastructure 
needs as well as to compact countries with reasonably 
good road networks like Rwanda. The agriculture budget 
figures for Rwanda do not include general infrastructure, 
nor – as noted above – do they include agricultural 
expenditures by districts (although this is a much smaller 
figure; if included, it raises the MINAGRI allocation in 
2010/11 to 7.2%). 10% may therefore be an appropriate 
proportion for Rwanda. 
It is both a comment on the RPF government’s ability 
to prioritise effectively during its first decade in power, 
and a reason for being hopeful about the future, that so 
much has been done so recently to overcome barriers 
to agricultural development. The Strategic Plan for 
Agricultural Transformation (PSTA) was completed in 
2004 and adopted as the basis of a SWAp in 2005. It was 
also in 2005 that the current land policy and land law 
were adopted, guaranteeing security of tenure and the 
possibility of a land market. The implementing agencies 
RADA and RARDA were established and the agriculture 
research institute was restructured in 2006. And 
earmarked transfers for agriculture to districts also started 
in 2006 (World Bank, 2010: 126-127). PSTA Phase II, dated 
2009, incorporates even more recent learning, including 
with respect to the speed of changeover to higher-value 
crops, demand-side obstacles to fertiliser use and 
extension services, closer attention to quality standards 
and marketing, and development of entrepreneurial 
capacities in farmer organisations – all ingredients for a 
more inclusive practice (MINAGRI, 2009: Ch I.4, II.2).10 PSTA 
II is considered by supporters to be a detailed and action-
oriented plan for implementing the main pillars of CAADP 
(OTF Group, 2009: 4).
It is too early to expect dramatic pay-offs from these 
improvements in the policy and institutional environment, 
particularly in view of the fact that the uplift in spending 
is even more recent. Indications of the major barriers 
that need to be overcome include the following:
When fertiliser imports were liberalised under a •	
mid-2000s strategy for increasing utilisation, 
private importation responded well, but peaked 
at 7,349 tons in 2005, far below the target of 
63,000 tons, because of low demand among 
farmers. Big commercial farmers were the 
principal beneficiaries. There are now strong 
indications that commodity-based cooperatives, 
where bulk purchases of inputs are combined 
with credit guarantees and associated extension 
services, can be an effective means of addressing 
the micro-level constraints (World Bank, 2010: 
127). But this is slow and organisationally 
challenging work.
The government has for some time been making •	
efforts to stimulate private-sector as well as 
smallholder investment in agriculture, including 
establishing an Agriculture Guarantee Fund in 
2005 to encourage bank lending to the sector 
(which was only 4% of the total lending in 2005). 
However, private investment has remained 
weaker than in other sectors. According to the 
World Bank (ibid: 129), this reflects primarily two 
constraints that may be difficult to address even 
in the medium term, high perceived risk and lack 
of access to external markets, issues we discuss 
with more specific reference to horticulture 
below.
In important respects the RPF-led government is still 
learning how to manage its agricultural sector 17 years 
after the genocide. Yet the discussion in this section 
seems to suggest that ‘learning’ is an entirely appropriate 
word to be using in connection with the Rwandan policy 
process. In contrast to the situation in neighbouring 
countries with superficially similar histories and political 
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constitutions, policy making and implementation seem 
to respond to powerful incentives to demonstrate success 
in the main fields of social and economic development. 
This did not immediately produce high-quality policy 
making or good results, but the signs are now relatively 
encouraging, because lessons have been learned. The 
horticultural sub-sector presents a somewhat different 
picture which is consistent with this broad conclusion.
4.3 How has horticulture 
been supported?
There has been little previous development of 
commercial horticulture in Rwanda, even though a large 
variety of fruits and vegetables have always been 
available in local markets (G&N Consultants, 2008). This 
seems likely to change in a big way over the coming 
years. Since 2007, a specialised agency for horticultural 
development (RHODA) has been running alongside the 
agency for agriculture. Through RHODA and the one-stop-
shop for investment promotion (RDB), the government 
is making a strong play to make Rwanda the place where 
international and regional investors will go after 
exhausting the horticultural potential of Kenya and 
Uganda. For the reasons given earlier, this is a reasonable 
ambition; for a number of horticultural crops Rwanda is 
already competitive in terms of yields without yet having 
made large investments (RDB/RHODA, 2010).
Until now, the Rwanda government’s approach to 
horticulture promotion has followed a relatively orthodox, 
light-touch approach to investment facilitation. That is, 
in this field it has made only limited use of the active 
industrial policy or venture-capital approach, using either 
the mechanism of the party holding company Tri-Star/
Crystal Ventures or the public-private partnership 
modality that has been preferred in some other fields 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). In other words, the 
philosophy is that it is the role of government and 
government agencies to create the basic conditions, 
including major infrastructure, appropriate legislation, 
conducive economic and social policies, and some 
modest subsidisation of learning costs for local 
entrepreneurs and small growers. Major investments are 
left to the expected foreign direct investment. An 
important issue for analysis of the sub-sector is whether 
this approach is appropriate and will be sufficient.
RHODA is joined in its transformative ambitions by a 
small number of medium-scale investors in horticultural 
contract farming, including young returnees with 
relevant business or professional experience from 
Uganda and elsewhere. Other players include three fruit 
processing businesses with contract-farming interests 
(Gérard Sina’s Urwibutso Enterprises, Shakina Enterprises 
and Inyange Industries). Inyange is one of the subsidiaries 
of Crystal Ventures Ltd. whereas the other two enterprises 
are family firms. RHODA itself is supported by a technical 
assistance project of Belgian Technical Cooperation, and 
pilot initiatives for particular crops are supported by 
USAID and DFID as well as by the national crop research 
organisation ISAR.11  
The horticulture policy extracts maximum benefit 
from Rwanda’s general selling points as an investment 
destination. Those include its low corruption indicators, 
high level of public security and recent star rating under 
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey (World 
Bank and IFC, 2010). The government took a while to 
grasp why it continued to get an indifferent rating from 
the Bank despite the general attractions of the 
environment for business, but having understood, it 
turned things around with remarkable speed. Most 
observers attribute this to the forceful and persistent 
attention to the implementation of policy commitments 
that President Kagame impresses on his subordinates, 
and they in turn on theirs.
The same leadership style has made its mark on 
RHODA and the implementation of the horticulture plans. 
In late 2009 or early 2010, the then head of RHODA was 
removed from his post by the president on grounds of 
proving insufficiently dynamic and replaced by a younger 
man. Kagame makes quite regular and well publicised 
visits to projects under RHODA’s remit such as the apple 
banana pilot scheme in Kibungo.12
Horticultural development in Rwanda is not expected 
to be a re-run of Kenya’s spectacular capture of market 
share in European supermarkets. Indeed, there is some 
awareness in Kigali of the discrepancy between the image 
and the reality of the Kenyan story, including the fact 
that as little as 4% of Kenyan produce finds its way into 
exports.13 Although the government’s interest in 
horticulture was originally prompted by its potential for 
export diversification, there is now significant interest 
in import-substitution and new consumption habits in 
the domestic market.14 Outside the country, the rapidly 
growing sub-regional (EAC and COMESA) markets are 
the main targets. Further afield, the Gulf and south Asia 
are seen as the most promising fields for global trading. 
Global market penetration is expected only for niche 
products, including Japanese plums, passion fruit, 
pineapples, apple bananas and the Hass and Fuerte 
varieties of avocado.15
The standard formula for private company investment 
in Rwandan horticulture requires the investor to establish 
production agreements with smallholders organised in 
cooperatives. The bulk of production is done by the 
individual cooperative members, with the cooperative 
serving as the channel for input supply, sensitisation on 
quality issues and commitments on volume. The investor 
is generally allocated a home farm on former grazing 
land where demonstration plots can be established and 
some direct production can be done. Large, centrally 
managed farms are out of the question, given the general 
land shortage.16
The government has supplied some of the 
infrastructural conditions for Rwanda to become a global 
player in horticulture, and has generally played an active 
facilitating role. It has constructed a cold storage facility 
at Kigali airport and a flower park is under construction.17 
RHODA and RDB with the support of the BTC project 
have enabled Rwandan horticulture investors to attend 
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agricultural trade fairs in Germany and elsewhere. A 
Rwanda Horticulture Inter-professionals Organisation 
(RHIO) was formed with official support in 2009, and has 
60 business and technical professionals as members. 
RHODA has contracted a Kenyan firm to advise on quality 
control in contract farming and it subsidises use of the 
certification services of Global Gap, which are essential 
to realising the best international prices.18 Subsidised 
fertiliser is being delivered to areas judged particularly 
suited to specific crops, along with awareness campaigns 
about necessary volume and quality standards.19 There 
is an active and much needed programme of research 
led by ISAR on planting materials and disease control.20 
Finally, agreements in principle have been reached with 
several air freight companies, and the national carrier 
Rwandair has been encouraged to invest in two new 
wide-bodied planes to serve routes to Dubai and 
Kinshasa, both target destinations for Rwandan 
horticulture.21
Currently, however, commercial horticulture in Rwanda 
is constrained by a series of what our interviewees refer 
to as chicken-and-egg problems – what might be termed 
more technically problems of market coordination.22 For 
the time being, assured production volumes are low. 
There is a good deal of work to be done with groups of 
small-scale producers and their cooperative structures 
to establish the right expectations and incentives for 
producing at high volumes with the necessary quality 
standards. Rwanda has already experienced a temporary 
ban on exports to the EU because of a failure to comply 
with sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (MINAGRI 
Strategic Issues paper, FY 2011/12). Getting the industry 
started on the cultivation side is transaction-intensive, 
and both the technical and the commercial learning costs 
are high. Until this is resolved, storage and transport 
facilities will be under-utilised, resulting in unit costs 
which cannot beat the competition from Uganda and 
elsewhere.23 While the government and supporting 
donors have gone some way towards bearing those costs 
centrally, it is not clear that this will be sufficient to give 
Rwandan producers the competitive advantage they 
need.24
The viability of the current approach relies on the 
possibility that some relatively large regional investors 
will be attracted and that, bringing relevant know-how 
with them, they will be prepared to bear the initial 
investments, including in respect of negotiating 
agreements with and providing ongoing technical 
extension services to groups of producers. This is in fact 
the model that has been followed by the existing 
processors, Urwibutso Enterprises, Inyange Industries 
and Shakina Enterprises, each of which has agreements 
with producer groups. The Kenyan supermarket 
Nakumatt, which is now established in Kigali, has some 
local producer agreements, although much of its sourcing 
is still regional.25 In the case of Urwibutso, the agreements 
include the provision of free or subsidised social services 
and a significant research and demonstration undertaking 
on the home farm. One well-known regional investor, 
East African Growers of Kenya, has established a contract-
farming operation – experimenting with irrigated French 
bean production, their stock-in-trade.26 However, it 
appears that others are watching and waiting.
If and when a breakthrough occurs on volume and 
quality of fruit and vegetable growing, bottlenecks will 
quickly appear on the processing side. Inyange Industries, 
the largest processor, has recently invested in a $30m 
state-of-the art pineapple and passion-fruit juicing plant. 
This has enabled the firm to establish agreements which 
are more remunerative for the producer groups and more 
easily supervised for quality. It is predicted that this will 
force the previous market leader in fresh juice, Urwibutso 
Enterprises, to upgrade its technology. However, it will 
remain the case that Rwanda has no plant for 
concentrating surplus passion fruit juice, and only one 
tomato processor.27
Given these challenges, there are those who argue 
that policy for horticulture needs to move into a more 
interventionist mode, with RHODA actively negotiating 
public-private joint ventures in which the state subsidises 
the initial learning costs and demonstration effects. 
Taking the Tri-Star/Crystal Ventures experience into 
account, this proposal seems to make good sense. For 
the moment, we can only say that that this is being 
considered. We have the impression that, like policy for 
agriculture, horticulture policy in Rwanda is a learning 
process, in which setbacks and frustrations have led and 
will continue lead to policy shifts. This would be 
unremarkable except for the ample evidence from the 
other countries included in the PEAPA study that, for 
political reasons, policy can stagnate year after year in 
spite of manifest failures to achieve its nominal 
objectives.
5 Conclusion
Rwanda is not, we have seen, a case of a regime with 
strong political reasons to take agriculture seriously that 
has also followed a consistent pattern of giving adequate 
priority to agriculture in public policy. The political 
economy of policy is certainly distinctive, for reasons 
that have a great deal to do with the country’s violent 
past and the way the RPF leadership has chosen to 
respond to it. However, agriculture is not yet a policy 
success story in Rwanda. The government cannot be said 
to have settled upon an appropriate set of policies and 
delivery mechanisms for agriculture quickly and 
unprompted. It took a substantial food crisis shock in 
the mid-2000s and a significant change of mindset 
among donors to get an appropriate set of measures 
adopted. In short, policy for agriculture has been in 
important respects laggard and inconsistent. However, 
there is more to be said about the Rwanda case, and this 
is more consistent with the PEAPA hypothesis.
First, we have described the recent evolution of policy 
as a learning process, one in which GoR and its donors 
have arrived in a genuinely joined-up way at what 
appears a viable and appropriate strategic vision. The 
food shock and disappointing income-poverty results 
of the mid-2000s produced, not a short-lived, knee-jerk 
political response, but a sustained effort on the fine detail 
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of what to do differently. Donors and officials worked 
together on this, not without tensions no doubt, but not 
pulling in opposite directions either. The signs are good 
that the agreed strategy works, with poverty indices and 
inequality at last coming down. It is to be hoped that 
this will encourage the recent trend to take public 
spending for agriculture up to and beyond the 
internationally recommended 10% target, as the adopted 
formula is very intensive in organisational, extension and 
research inputs.
Second, at various points, we have highlighted 
indications of serious implementation effort, including 
correction of errors. Policy is not politicised in the ways 
that produce rigidity and stagnation elsewhere in the 
region. Implementation, while in many ways imperfect, 
is subject to performance pressures that are not widely 
observed in other countries with similar public-sector 
traditions. Abuses and unanticipated snags occur, but 
there are mechanisms for correcting them, including 
presidential interventions and arrangements such as an 
Annual National Dialogue, in which implementation 
targets are reviewed in public in a performance-oriented 
atmosphere. These are all favourable factors in considering 
the chances that agriculture and horticulture will make 
up lost ground in the years ahead.
Finally, regarding horticulture in particular several of 
the right actions have been taken. Policy action to 
improve the general business climate was remarkably 
rapid, and we will not be surprised to learn of further 
proactive adjustments as it becomes clearer that a sound 
business climate is not going to be enough on its own 
to induce more foreign investors into contract farming. 
In fact, it seems not only feasible but desirable that 
Rwanda adopts in horticulture more of the active public-
private-partnership and ‘early stage venture capitalism’ 
approach with which it has achieved success in other 
areas of the economy.
END NOTES
*   Respectively, Director of the Africa Power and 
Politics Programme, based at the Overseas 
Development Institute in London, and APPP 
Associate based in Kampala, Uganda. We are 
grateful to Colin Poulton and two anonymous 
referees for comments on a previous draft of this 
paper, but retain full responsibility for its 
contents.
1 The PEAPA studies are strongly seconded in this 
respect by other recent research, including notably 
the results of the Elites, Production and Poverty 
Programme (Whitfield, 2011; Whitfield and 
Therkildsen, 2011).
2   It is based on a subset of 82 confidential interviews 
and other conversations conducted in Rwanda 
between 2007 and 2011 as well as on relevant 
documents and publications. 
3 This finding is based in part on direct observation 
by Frederick Golooba-Mutebi of several Annual 
National Dialogue sessions and the testimony 
provided to him by participants in ministerial 
retreats.
4 Interviews with Rwandan government minister, 
permanent secretary, and high-ranking security 
official, Kigali, Dec 2007 and Mar 2009.
5  For example, Pottier and Nkundabashaka (1992) 
and Pottier (1993).
 6 Between 1999 and 2006 crop output increases were 
due 15% to increased land area and 85% to 
productivity improvements, with roots and tubers 
leading the way (Rwirahira, 2009: 20).
7 Interview with former minister, Kigali, July 2011.
8   Interviews with horticulture investor and minister, 
Kigali, Feb and Nov 2010.
 9 Interview with horticulture investor, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
10 An appreciation largely shared by a sector situation 
analysis undertaken for the local think-tank, IPAR 
(Rwirahira, 2009).
11  Interviews with horticulture investors, Kigali, March 
2010.
12 Ibid.
13 Interviews with government official and minister, 
Kigali, Mar and Nov 2010.
14 Interview with technical assistant, RHODA, Kigali, 
Nov 2010.
15 Interviews with horticulture investors, Kigali, March 
2010.
16 Interview with horticulture investor, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
17 Interviews with horticulture investor and minister, 
Kigali, Mar and Nov 2010.
18 Interviews with horticulture investors, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
19  Ibid.
20   Interview with horticulture investor, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
21 Interviews with horticulture investor and minister, 
Kigali, Mar and Nov 2010.
22  The following points are discussed in these terms 
and in some detail by the first report of a One UN 
project (Mbanda and Rusharaza, 2010).
23 Interview with minister, Kigali, Nov 2010.
24 Interview with horticulture investor, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
25 Interview with government official, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
26  Interviews with horticulture investors, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
27   Interview with government official, Kigali, Mar 
2010.
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